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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PRICE-OREM INVESTMENT
COMPANY, A Limited Partnership,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
ROLLINS, BROWN & GUNNELL, INC.,

No. 19096

Defendant-Respondent.
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE MAURICE HARDING, JUDGE, and
HONORABLE DAVID SAM, JUDGE, presiding.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by an owner of land against an engineering firm for damages proximately caused by the negligent
surveying and staking of the owner's property.
DISPOSITION BELOW
This matter was tried to a jury, Maurice Harding, District Judge pro tern, presiding, on November 17, 18, and 19,
1980.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff and

assessed damages of $30,000.

R. 101, 107.

Judge Harding

subsequently granted defendant's motion for a new trial.

R.

140.

The case was again set for trial, before David Sam,

District Judge, on March 1, 1983.

At the time set for trial,

the District Court ruled that John Price Associates, Inc.,
the plaintiff's contractor, was an indispensable party, and
later dismissed the action upon plaintiff's election not to
amend the complaint to add John Price Associates, Inc. as a
party.

R. 147-48.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Plaintiff requests that the District Court's order granting a new trial be reversed and the matter remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the plaintiff, or, in the
alternative, that the District Court's order granting a new
trial be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial on
the issue of damages only, or, in the further alternative,
that the District Court's order dismissing the action for
failure to join an indispensable party be reversed and the
matter remanded for trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are established by the pleadings and
the evidence adduced at the trial of this matter.

Sometime

during the first part of July, 1973, the defendant agreed to
survey and stake the corners of certain property belonging to
the plaintiff in preparation for the construction of the Orem
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plaza Shopping Center in Orem, Utah.

Plaintiff's Amended

complaint alleged that defendant agreed to survey and stake
the property for plaintiff.

R. 10.

The defendant's Answer

to Amended Complaint admitted that the plaintiff retained the
services of Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc.

R. 13.

The defendant performed the survey and staked the property corners.

Tr. Vol. I at 202, R. 366.

In fact, the

defendant staked two sets of property corners, one for a
fenceline and one for the title line.
380.

Tr. Vol. I at 216, R.

Russell Brown testified that defendant knew the differ-

ence between the two sets of stakes and that the survey's
field notes reflected the difference.

Id.

Mr. Brown also

testified that plaintiff relied upon defendant to stake the
property corners.

Id.

Following the survey, the defendant

certified, on July 27, 1973, by and through its agent Carr F.
Greer, that plaintiff's property had been properly staked to
represent the boundaries shown on the signed surveyor's certificate, dated July 27, 1973.

Tr. Vol. I at 153, R. 317.

Pltf. Ex. 4.

During the fall of 1973, John Price Associates, Inc.
("JPA"), the contractor for the project, began grading,
placing fill, and compacting, in order to have the site
prepared for construction in the spring of 1974.
at 27, R. 191.

Tr. Vol.

I

On June 6, 1974, JPA issued a purchase order
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to the defendant for, among other things, staking of the
building corners of the Skaggs building.
45-46, R. 209-10.

Def. Ex. 7.

Tr. Vol. I at

The Skaggs building was the

first portion of the Orem Plaza Shopping Center scheduled for
construction.

The Skaggs building was to be followed by con·

struction of a large restaurant area, small shop space, and
two free-standing buildings, all as part of the development
of the shopping center.
On June 14, 1974, David Thurgood, an engineer employed by
defendant, took a surveying team to the site and contacted
the superintendent, Jim Marshall.
410.

Tr. Vol. I at 246, R.

Mr. Thurgood took with him a copy of the construction

plans, a site plan and other drawings dealing with construe·
tion of the building, but did not take the survey done by
defendant the previous summer or the survey field notes.
Vol. I at 246, 259, R. 410, 423.

Tr.

Mr. Marshall requested Mr.

Thurgood to stake the four corners of the building and then
place offset stakes from those four corners to permit excava·
tion for the footings. Tr. Vol. I at 248, R. 412.
Because of the proximity of the Skaggs location to the
northwest corner of the property, Mr. Thurgood used that corner as a starting point to lay out the building.
at 248-49, R. 412-13.

Tr. Vol. I

The corner was marked with a one inch

diameter rebar, and a one inch by two inch wooden stake.
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"N.W. property corner" was written on the wooden stake, indicating that the rebar marked the northwest property corner.

Tr. Vol. I at 264, R. 428.

The survey performed by

defendant the previous summer indicates that the property
corners were marked with one inch diameter rebars.
I at 265, R. 429.

Pltf. Ex. 4.

Tr. Vol.

Although Mr. Thurgood did

not know specifically who put the wooden stake by the one
inch diameter rebar, he testified that it would have been the
same person that placed the pin, i.e.,

"representatives of

persons that performed the survey of Rollins, Brown & Gunnell
Tr. Vol. I at 267, R. 431.

Russell Brown testified

that some of the reference points shown on the survey were
used in staking the building corners, Tr. Vol. I at 154, R.
318, and that defendant had in fact staked the property corners.

Tr. Vol. I at 202, R. 366.

Using the northwest corner as a starting point, Mr.
Thurgood and his crew sighted along the west boundary line
and came down the line the indicated distance.

They then

turned ninety degrees to the west property line and staked
the buidings corners and placed offset stakes.
251-52, R.

415-16.

northwest corner.

Tr. Vol. I at

The crew then traversed back to the
Id.

On July 15, 1974, the defendant was requested by Mr.
Marshall, the construction superintendent, to stake the curb
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and gutter along the south side of 200 North Street (which
was directly north of the Orem Plaza Shopping Center project).

Tr. Vol. I at 252, R. 146.

On July 17, 1974, Mr.

Thurgood and his crew began to perform that work.

Id.

Once

again, the northwest corner was used as the starting point.
Id.

The defendant's crew proceeded to stake the curb and

gutter until Mr. Thurgood noticed that the line which was
being staked would intersect the east boundary of the property farther south of the northeast corner than it should
have.

Tr. Vol. I at 253, R. 417.

After obtaining the survey

from defendant's office and verifying the distances and property corners as shown thereon, Mr. Thurgood discovered that
the northwest corner, which had been used as the starting
point to stake the Skaggs building, was 30 feet south of the
northwest corner shown on the site plan.
253-54, R. 417-18.

Tr. Vol. I at

Russell Brown admitted that the Skaggs

building was not staked out in proper relation to the property corners as shown on the plot plan.

Tr. Vol. I at 201,

R. 365.
Defendant contacted JPA and informed it of the error on
July 17, 1974.

Tr. Vol. I at 255, R. 419.

A couple of days

later, representatives of defendant and JPA met at the job
site to discuss the problem.

Id.

During the month between

the time the building corners were staked and the time the
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error was discovered, construction had moved forward considerably on the Skaggs building.

For example, between June

14 and July 17, approximately 235 cubic yards, or 20 to 25
truckloads, of concrete were poured.
R. 266-67, Def. Ex. 8.

Tr. Vol.

I at 101-02,

Most of the concrete poured was for

footings and the slab for the Skaggs building.
31, 72-73, R. 195, 236-37.

Tr. Vol.

I at

Most of the interior footings

were completed, including re-enforcing steel and bolts.

Id.

A large number of the slabs, approximately fifteen to twenty
thousand square feet, had been poured.

Id.

Plumbing and

electrical work was in place under the slabs since that work
could not be installed after the slabs were poured.

Id.

small amount of concrete was poured for curb and gutter.
Vol. I at 75, R. 239.

A
Tr.

On July 18, 1974, the day after defen-

dant discovered the staking error, the first tilt-up panels
were poured.

Tr. Vol. I at 102-03, R. 266-67.

panels had been formed.

Other tilt-up

Tr. Vol. I at 31, R. 195.

After discovering the staking error and consulting with
representatives of JPA, defendant was requested to prepare a
survey showing the actual location of the Skaggs building
with respect to the property boundaries.
R. 420.

Tr. Vol. I at 256,

Defendant prepared this survey, which showed that

the Skaggs building was located approximately 30 feet south
of its intended location.

Tr. Vol.
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I at 256,

258, R. 420,

422, Pltf. Ex. 5.

If plaintiff had continued to build the

shopping center as planned, the building would have extended
over the south property line.

Tr. Vol. I at 38, R. 202.

Several possible remedial measures were explored, Tr.
Vol. I at 72, R. 236; however, due to financing, costs, and
lease limitations, plaintiff ultimately decided to absorb the
30 foot error by shortening the shop space planned for the
south end of the shopping center.
203-04.

Tr. Vol. I at 39-40, R.

In order to allow for the surveying error and to

avoid building the shopping center across the south property
line, in the latter part of July, 1974, plaintiff instructed
the architect to redesign the shop space.
Vol. II at 58, R. 204, 524.

Tr. Vol. I at 40,

Since the shop space was de-

signed for a depth of 70 feet, Tr. Vol. II at 52, R. 518,
this resulted in the loss of 2100 square feet of shop space.
Tr. Vol. II at 59, R. 525.
Other alternatives suggested by defendant and considered
by the plaintiff in attempting to minimize the damage caused
by the surveying error were rejected as incompatible with the
time constraints imposed by plaintiff's financing commitment,
excessively expensive in terms of increased construction
costs, and/or economically impracticable.

The primary con-

sideration in determining what to do was the completion deadline imposed by Aetna Life Insurance Company, which had com-
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mitted to provide a 30-year mortgage loan of $1,900,000, with
interest at 8.75%.

Tr. Vol.

I at 39, R. 203, Pltf. Ex. 2.

The commitment expired on January 30, 1975, and Aetna was not
required to disburse any funds prior to November 18, 1974.
Pltf. Ex.

2.

As a means of paying the commitment fee of

$38,000 to Aetna, the plaintiff provided two letters of
credit payable to Aetna, each in the amount of $19,000.
Vol. I at 25-26, R. 189-90, Pltf. Ex. 3.

Tr.

In the event the

loan closed on or after November 18, 1974, but on or before
November 30, 1974, the entire commitment fee of $38,000 was
to be returned to the plaintiff.

Id.

In the event the loan

closed on or after December 1, 1974, but on or before December 30, 1974, one-half of the commitment fee, or $19,000,
would be returned to the plaintiff.

Id.

If the loan closed

after December 30, 1974, but before the commitment expired on
January 30, 1975, Aetna was entitled to retain the entire
commitment fee.

Id.

In order to close on the Aetna loan, plaintiff was required, by the loan commitment and mortgage loan application,
to have the Skaggs building substantially completed.
Vol. I at 25, R. 189, Pltf. Ex. 1 and 2.

Tr.

Thus, delays in

construction could risk the loss of up to $38,000 in commitment fees, and perhaps the entire funding commitment.
Vol.

I at 34-35, R. 198-99.

Tr.

John Price, the general partner
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of plaintiff, was seriously concerned that the delay caused
in construction by attempting to move the Skaggs building 30
feet to the north would jeopardize the Aetna loan commitment.
met.

Id.

In actual fact, the funding deadline was barely

Tr. Vol. II at 63, R. 529.
Lease restrictions prevented plaintiff from recouping the

lost frontage at any other economically feasible area on the
property.

Skaggs, the anchor tenant for the shopping center,

would not permit any building to be built on its north side
or directly in front of the Skaggs store, the only available
locations.

Tr. Vol. I at 62-63, Tr. Vol. II at 30-31, R.

226-27, 496-97, Pltf. Ex. 11.

In short, there was no way to

find an additional 30 feet of frontage.
Since the economic value in the shopping center is found
in the frontage available, and not purely in the size of the
structure, plaintiff did not consider it feasible to deepen
the shop space or build additional space in the back of the
mall.

Tr. Vol. I at 99, R. 263.

be 70 feet deep.

The shops were planned to

Adding additional depth to the shops was

not economically practicable since the additional space would
have been unleaseable.

Tr. Vol. I at 39, 54, 71, 127-28, R.

203, 218, 235, 291-92.

Two free-standing sites had already

been planned for the area in front of the shop space and
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restaurant; therefore, that space was unavailable to pick up
the lost frontage.

Tr. Vol. I at 55, R. 219.

Finally, defendant suggested and plaintiff considered the
option of resituating the Skaggs Drug Center 30 feet north of
where it had actually been built.

Russell Brown, one of the

principals of the defendant, testified that there were no
electrical installations in the concrete at the time he observed the project in early September, 1974.
172-73, R. 336-37.
at 173, R. 337.

Tr. Vol. I at

There was one plumbing stub.

Tr. Vol. I

Mr. Price testified that some electrical and

plumbing work had been set in the concrete that had been
poured.

Tr. Vol. I at 75, 115, R. 239, 279.

Mr. Brown made an estimate of the cost involved in implementing the repairs he contemplated.
337.

Tr. Vol. I at 173, R.

The work generally involved removing the south 30 feet

of concrete of the Skaggs buiding, disposing of that concrete
in some manner, regrading that area, grading the north 30
feet of the Skaggs building, pouring concrete along the north
30 feet of the building, including laying in reinforcing
steel, and moving any electrical and plumbing equipment which
had been put in place.

Tr. Vol. I at 173-74, R. 337-38.

Mr.

Brown estimated that all of the foregoing work could be
accomplished at a cost of approximately $3,000.
at 173-76, R. 337-40.

Tr. Vol. I

Mr. Brown also testified that this
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work could be accomplished in ten working days, assuming a
contractor, the equipment and the personnel were immediately
available to perform the work.

Tr. Vol. I at 208-09, R.

372-373.
Mr. Price testified that the remedy advocated by Russell
Brown was not feasible since the column spacings and footings
were not placed at uniform distances corresponding to the
thirty foot surveying error.

Instead, "the footings were set

at varying distances corresponding to the placement of the
tenant's gondolas, aisles and refrigeration equipment.
Vol. I at 100-101, R. 264-65.
moved.

The footings could not be

Tr. Vol. I at 76, R. 240.

would cure the problem.

Tr.

Only total replacement

Tr. Vol. I at 76, 103, R. 240, 267.

Moving the whole building would require 30 to 90 days, depending upon negotiations with subcontractors and tenants,
and securing authorization from the tenant.

Tr. Vol. I at

103, R. 267.
Mr. Price estimated the total cost of repair at approximately $100,000.

Tr. Vol. I at 75, R. 239.

The repairs

would cost thirty to forty thousand dollars for repouring the
concrete alone.

Id.

In addition, the costs of repair had to

include the risk of increased cost resulting from renegotiating with contractors and materialmen.
39, R. 200, 203.

Tr. Vol. I at 36,

The bids upon which JPA relied had been

-12-

submitted six months previously and the costs of construction
had gone up substantially in the meantime.

R. 239.

Tr. Vol. I at 75,

Thus, asking the subcontractors to do additional

work on the project would subject JPA to a possible escalation of the cost of other work to be performed under the
subcontracts and materials to be supplied.

Tr. Vol. I at 36,

R. 200.
At the trial of this matter, a real estate appraiser
testified as to plaintiff's damages.

Ralph Wright, an MAI

appraiser, examined the property and prepared a report, which
was admitted into evidence.
Ex. 12.
loss.

Tr. Vol. II at 42, R. 508, Pltf.

Mr. Wright used two methods to assess plaintiff's
First, using an annuity approach over the probable

economic life of the project, Mr. Wright estimated the present value of the plaintiff's lost net income at $80,598.
Vol. I at 125, R. 289.

Tr.

Second, by comparing the value of the

property as built to the value of the property if constructed
as planned, Mr. Wright estimated the present value of the
loss at $72,351.

Tr. Vol. I at 126, R. 290.

In the second

approach, Mr. Wright concluded that the land alone would have
increased in value $30,000 had the plaintiff fully developed
the property as planned. Pltf. Ex. 12.

Based upon these fig-

ures, Mr. Wright concluded that the present value of plaintiff's loss was $75,000.

Tr. Vol. I at 126, R. 290.
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Defen-

dant offered no direct evidence on the loss of value of the
land or future net income.
At the trial of this matter in 1980, the jury returned a
verdict in the amount of $30,000 in favor of the plaintiff.
R. 101, 107.

Several days later, the defendant moved for

judgment n.o.v. or, in the alternative, for a remittitur or a
new trial.

R. 126.

On January 12, 1981, Judge Maurice

Harding granted the motion for a -new trial on the ground
"that the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict".
R. 140.

After further briefing by the parties, the court

reaffirmed its decision of January 12, 1981, and noted "that
a new trial should be granted in this case on the basis that
the damages were excessive and on the basis that there was no
culpable negligence on the part of the engineers."

There-

after, the case was set for a new trial.
On March 1, 1983, the day set for trial, Judge David Sam,
upon consideration of a trial brief filed by defendant, concluded, sua sponte, that John Price Associates, Inc.

(the

contractor for the Orem Plaza Project) was an indispensable
party in the matter.

R. 147-48.

The district court granted

the plaintiff ten days within which to amend its complaint
and add John Price Associates, Inc. as an indispensable
party, or suffer a dismissal of the action.
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Id.

The plain-

tiff elected not to amend the complaint, and the action was
dismissed pursuant to Judge Sam's order.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT
A NEW TRIAL.
As noted above, at the trial of this matter the jury
returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and assessed
damages of $30,000.

Later, Judge Harding granted the defen-

dant's motion for a new trial.

The district court's ruling

was erroneous since the record contains no substantial competent evidence to support a verdict for the defendant.
The standard under which this court will review a trial
court's decision on a motion for a new trial depends upon
whether the trial court has denied or granted the motion.
Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 731

(Utah 1982).

Where, as

in this matter, the trial court has granted a motion for a
new trial, the Supreme Court will affirm on appeal if the
record reflects "substantial competent evidence which would
support a verdict for the

[moving party]."

King v. Union

Pacific R. R. Co., 117 Utah 40, 53, 212 P.2d 692, 698

(1949).

In granting defendant's motion for a new trial, the
district court held "that the evidence was insufficient to
justify the verdict."

R. 140.

A review of the record, how-
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ever, reveals that there is no substantial competent evidPnce
to support a verdict for defendant, either on the issue of
liability or the amount of damages suffered by plaintiff.
The negligence of defendant in staking the corners of
plaintiff's property was well established by the pleadings
and the evidence at trial.

The undisputed testimony was that

defendant staked the property corners for plaintiff in the
summer of 1973.

The northwest property corner was marked by

one inch diameter rebar and a wood stake.

The evidence is

undisputed that the rebar and wooden stake were placed by the
defendant.

The evidence is likewise undisputed that the

northwest property corner was marked about thirty feet south
of the point indicated by the survey.

In fact, the defendant

admitted, in its answer to plaintiff's amended complaint,
that it "erroneously set the stakes on plaintiff's property.•

R. 10-11, 13-14.

Defendant also stated, in its

answer to the amended complaint:

"The defendant, Rollins,

Brown' Gunnell, Inc., admits that a mistake was made in
staking of the plaintiff's property by one of its agents and
employees, but denies that the plaintiff has suffered damaged
by reason thereof."

R. 14.

At the trial, defendant re-

quested that the court instruct the jury that the defendant,
Rollins, Brown '
case.•

R. 32.

Gunnell "has admitted liability in this
This instruction was not given by the court.
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,

considering all the evidence adduced at the trial of this
matter and the admissions contained in the pleadings, the
record lacks substantial competent evidence to support a
verdict for defendant on the issue of liability.
On the issue of damages, substantial competent evidence
to support a verdict for the defendant is likewise absent.
The defendant's evidence respecting damages was solely on the
issue of mitigation.

The trial court erred in considering

and submitting to the jury the defendant's evidence respecting mitigation of damages, since the issue was not raised as
an affirmative defense as required by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

In Pratt v. Board of Education of Uintah County

School District, 564 P.2d 294, 298

(Utah 1977), the Utah

Supreme Court held that mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense required to be pleaded under Utah R. Civ. P.
8(c), or the defense is waived, Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h).

Con-

sequently, this evidence was not relevant, not admissible,
and not competent to support a verdict for the defendant.
Defendant presented no direct evidence on the value of
the rental space or use of land lost as a result of defendant's mis-staking of the property corners.

Instead, defen-

dant argued that at the time the error was discovered the
Skaggs building could have been moved about 30 feet to the
north at a cost of approximately $3,000.
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The defendant did

not contend that at the time of trial moving the Skaggs
building was feasible.

The issue presented was whether the

plaintiff acted reasonably, at the time the error was discovered to minimize the damages resulting from defendant's
negligence.

Plaintiff objected to defendant's testimony on

mitigation on the grounds that it was not placed in issue by
the pleadings and was inadmissible under the rules set forth
in Pratt, supra.

The objection

overruled by the trial

court, Tr. Vol. I at 171, R. 335, and the issue was submitted
to the jury.

R. 95.

The trial court erred to the extent it relied upon such
evidence and considered issues beyond the pleadings in granting defendant's motion for a new trial.

In determining

whether there was substantial competent evidence to support a
verdict for defendant on the issue of damages, this court
sh0uld disregard evidence relating to mitigation of damages.
Even if one assumes that the defendant properly raised
the issue of mitigation of damages, defendant failed as a
matter of law to demonstrate that the plaintiff did not act
reasonably to avoid the consequences of defendant's negligence.

The general rule is that an injured party may not

recover damages flowing from a defendant's act which reasonably should have been avoided.
425, 428 (Utah 1936).

Jankele v. Texas Co., 54 P.2d

However, the plaintiff is only re-
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quired to act as "an ordinarily prudent man" would be expected to act under like circumstances.

Id.

Thus, the

defendant has the burden of showing not only that the plaintiff could have reduced its damages, but that doing so was
reasonable under the circumstances.
An injured party's duty to minimize damages does not
require it to "enter into other risky contracts, incur unreasonable inconvenience or expense,
business."

[or] disorganize [its]

Barbara Oil Co. v. Patrick Petroleum Co., 566

P.2d 389, 393-94

(Kan. App. 1977)

tracts§ 336, Comment (a)).

(quoting Restatment of Con-

The Restatement also notes, "It

is not reasonable to expect the plaintiff to avoid harm if at
the time for action it appears that the attempt may cause
other serious harm."

Id.

See also Restatement

Contracts § 350, Comment (g)

(Second) of

(1981).

When analyzed under the foregoing standard, plaintiff, as
a matter of law acted reasonably to avoid the damages flowing
from defendant's negligence.

Perhaps more importantly, de-

fendant presented no substantial competent evidence that
plaintiff acted unreasonably.

Mr. Brown testified that the

repairs would take ten working days, assuming that the contractor, equipment and personnel were immediately available
to perform the work.

Tr. Vol. I at 208-09, R. 372-73.

The

fact that plaintiff had a deadline to substantially complete
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the Skaggs building in order to meet a commitment for long
term financing was not contested by defendant.

Failure to

complete the building by November 30, 1974, would have meant
the loss of $19,000 (one-half of the loan commitment fee).
Failure to deliver a substantially complete building by
December 30, 1974, would have meant the loss of an additional
$19,000.

If the building was not substantially complete by

January 30, 1975, the entire funding commitment would have
been lost.

Plaintiff did not act unreasonably in refusing to

risk its financing by moving the Skaggs building and delaying
its completion.
In addition, it was plaintiff's judgment that the repairs
advocated by defendant were not feasible and that the only
way to change the location of the Skaggs building was to tear
out all of the concrete which had been poured for the footings and slab.

Instead of defendant's suggested cost of

$3,000, plaintiff estimated that it would cost $100,000 to
repair the consequences of the error.

Defendant presented no

evidence that plaintiff's judgment as to cost of repair was
unreasonable.
Even if one assumes that plaintiff could have moved the
Skaggs building thirty feet north at a cost of $3,000 and
still completed the building on time; nevertheless, defendant
presented no evidence that plaintiff acted unreasonably in
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failing to do so.

The acts of plaintiff must be judged in

light of the circumstances prevailing at the time action was
needed.

As a matter of law, the plaintiff was not required

to take the risk advocated by defendant.
The pleadings and the evidence presented at trial demonstrate that there was no substantial competent evidence to
support a verdict for defendant on either the issue of liability or damages.

In short, the district court erred in

granting defendant a new trial.

This Court should reverse

the district court's order granting a new trial and remand
with instructions to reinstate the jury verdict for plaintiff.

Alternatively, the Court should reverse the district

court's order granting a new trial and remand for a new trial
on the issue of damages only.
POINT II
THE
WAS
ING
NOT

TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT JPA
AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY AND IN DISMISSTHE ACTION UPON PLAINTIFF'S ELECTION
TO AMEND ITS COMPLAINT.

John Price Associates, Inc.

("JPA") was the contractor

for plaintiff on the Orem Plaza Shopping Center.

JPA issued

the purchase order pursuant to which defendant staked the
corners of the Skaggs building.

At the time set for the

second trial of this case, defendant submitted a trial brief
arguing, in part, that, under Utah R. Civ. P. 19,
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JPA was an

indispensable party to the action.

The district court ruled,

sponte, that JPA was a indispensable party and granted
plaintiff ten days within which to amend its complaint to
name JPA as a party, or suffer dismissal of the complaint.
Plaintiff elected not to name JPA as a party: consequently,
the amended complaint was dismissed.
Since JPA was neither a necessary nor indispensable
party, the district court erred .in dismissing the action.
Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a) states:
Subject to the provisions of Rule 23 and of subdivision (b) of this rule, persons having a joint
interest shall be made parties and be joined on the
same side as plaintiffs or defendants. When a person who should join is a plaintiff refuses to do so,
or his consent cannot be obtained, he may be made a
defendant or, in proper cases, an involuntary plaintiff.
Defendant argued that JPA had a joint interest with plaintiff, since JPA issued the purchase order to defendant to
stake the Skaggs building and was the real party in interest.

Although there is some confusion in the defendant's use

of labels, it appears that the district court believed that
there was no privity of contract between plaintiff and defendant and, therefore, plaintiff had no cause of action.

How-

ever, since there was a contract between JPA and defendant,
JPA had a cause of action and, in turn, was liable to plaintiff.
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JPA cannot be considered to be a necessary or indispensable party under Rule 19, since it has no joint interest in
the action with plaintiff.

The only party damaged by the

defendant's failure to properly stake the property corners
was plaintiff, the owner of the property.

Since JPA suffered

no damage, it has no joint interest in the action.

Also, the

defendant admitted in its pleadings that it had been retained
by plaintiff to stake the property corners.

The damages suf-

fered by plaintiff were proximately caused by the erroneous
staking of the northwest corner of the property, since that
corner was used as the starting point to stake the the corners of the Skaggs building.

Thus, the negligent act for

which plaintiff seeks damages arises out of a contract between plaintiff and defendant, not between JPA and defendant.
Assuming, arguendo, that the contract out of which plaintiff's damages arose was between defendant and JPA, rather
than between defendant and plaintiff, plaintiff's amended
complaint nevertheless states a cause of action against
defendant in tort.

Plaintiff may independently maintain an

action against defendant, notwithstanding the fact that the
circumstances giving rise to the tort claim may also justify
a breach of contract claim.
In Bushnell v. Sillitoe, 550 P.2d 1284, 1286

(Utah 1976),

the court stated: "This court has never ruled as to whether
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there must be privity of contract between a surveyor and a
party who sustains damage, because of a surveyor's negligent
misrepresentation."

While the opinion in Bushnell is some-

what unclear, the court appears to adopt the rule of Restatement of Torts S 552:
One who in the course of his business or profession
supplies information for the guidance of others in
their business transactions is subject to liability
for harm caused to them by their reliance upon the
information if (a) he fails.to exercise that care
and competence in obtaining and communicating the
information which its recipient is justified in
expecting, and (bl the harm is suffered (i) by the
person or one of the class of persons for whose
guidance the information was supplied, and (ii)
because of his justifiable reliance upon it in a
transaction in which it was intended to influence
his conduct or in a transaction substantially
identical therewith.
Id. at 1286 n. 4.

In Bushnell, the court noted that the

plaintiffs (adjacent property owners) were not within the
class of persons for whose guidance the information was
supplied by the surveyor.
The court adopted a similar rule in Milliner v. Elmer Fox

& Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974).

In Milliner, purchasers of

stock brought an action against an accountant to recover for
the loss of value of the stock.

The plaintiffs alleged that

they purchased shares of stock in a company in reliance upon
financial statements prepared by the accounting firm, that
the financial statements were false, and that the accountants
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were negligent in the preparation of the financial statements.

The accountants raised lack of privity of contract as

a defense; however, the court held:
We are of the opinion that the lack of privity is
not a defense where an accountant who is aware of
the fact that his work will be relied on by a party
or parties who may extend credit to his client or
assume his client's obligations. A future purchaser
of shares of stock of a corporation, however, belongs to an unlimited class of equity holders who
could not be reasonably foreseen as a third party
who would be expected to rely on a financial statement prepared by an accountant for the corporation.
Id. at BOB.

Thus, the existence of a duty does not depend

upon a contract, but upon the foreseeability of injury to a
specific party.

Certainly, it is foreseeable that the owner

of real estate will be injured by a surveyor's negligence.
If a duty is owed to plaintiff in this action, JPA can in no
way be construed as a necessary or indispensable party.
The California Court of Appeals considered the issue
raised by Rollins, Brown & Gunnell in Kent v. Bartlett, 49
Cal. App. 3d 724

(1975), wheren the plaintiffs-land owners

brought an action for damages caused by defendant-surveyor's
negligent performance of a contract to survey property.

The

trial court granted judgment for defendant after plaintiffs'
opening statement on the ground that there was no privity of
contract.

The California court reversed, holding that defen-

dant could reasonably anticipate that the survey would be
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relied upon by plaintiffs, subsequent purchasers of the property, and therefore owed a duty to plaintiffs.

See Rozny v.

Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E. 2d 656 (1969).
Although denominated a dismissal for failure to join an
indispensable party, it appears that the trial court's decision was based upon the erroneous belief that plaintiff had
no independent cause of action
gence.

defendant for negli-

The damage to plaintiff, as owner of the property

surveyed and staked, was foreseeable; therefore, defendant
owed a duty to plaintiff to refrain from negligent acts.

The

court's order dismissing plaintiff's complaint for failure to
join JPA was in error and should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in grantng defendant a new trial
since there was no substantial competent evidence to support
a verdict for defendant.

The district court likewise erred

in ruling that JPA was a necessary and indispensable party.
The Court should reverse the orders of the district court and
remand with directions to reinstate the jury verdict, or,
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alternatively, remand for a new trial on damages only, or, in
the further alternative, remand for a new trial.
DATED this 29th day of July, 1983.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By

George:H\Jn t

Bryce D. Panzer
Attorneys for Appellant
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